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Abstract 
 
 This paper studies pricing and investment decisions on a congested transport corridor where 
the elements of the corridor are controlled by different governments. A corridor can be an interstate 
highway or railway line, or an inter-modal connection. We model the simplest corridor: two transport 
links in series, where each of the links is controlled by a different government. Each link is used by 
transit as well as by local traffic; both links are subject to congestion. We consider a two stage non-
cooperative game where both governments strategically set capacity in the first stage and play a pricing 
game in the second stage. Three pricing regimes are distinguished: (i) differentiated tolls between local 
and transit transport, (ii) one uniform toll on local and transit traffic, and (iii) only the local users can 
be tolled. Numerical analysis illustrates all theoretical insights. A number of interesting results are 
obtained. First, transit tolls on the network will be inefficiently high. If only local traffic can be tolled, 
however, the Nash equilibrium tolls are inefficiently low. Second, raising the toll on transit through a 
given country by one euro raises the toll on the whole trajectory by less than one euro. Third, higher 
capacity investment in a given region not only reduces optimal tolls in this region under all pricing 
regimes but it also increases the transit tolls on the other link of the corridor. Fourth, capacities in the 
different regions are strategic complements: when one country on the corridor increases transport 
capacity, it forces the other country to do the same.  Fifth, we find interesting interactions between 
optimal capacities and the set of pricing instruments used: capacity with differentiated tolls is 
substantially higher than in the case of uniform tolls but overall welfare is lower. Finally, if transit is 
sufficiently important, it may be welfare improving not to allow any tolling at all, or to only allow the 
tolling of locals.  
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0. Introduction 
 The purpose of this paper is to study pricing and investment decisions on a 
congested transport corridor of which each of the links are under the jurisdiction of a 
different government. Fiscal and expenditure externalities give rise to strategic pricing 
and investment behaviour by the various governments involved. Potential 
applicability of the analysis includes investment and pricing on Trans European 
Networks (“TEN’s” basically a border-crossing highway, rail or multimodal system) 
in Europe and the interstate highway system in the US. Moreover, it is equally 
relevant for pricing and investment decisions for inter-modal trips where the transfer 
facility (ports, airports, freight terminal) and the upstream or downstream 
infrastructure is controlled by different governments or by different private 
monopolists. The paper yields new theoretical insights, and it illustrates the results 
using numerical simulation analysis.  
 Interstate highways in the US and the TEN’s in Europe have raised many 
policy questions. The two most prominent ones are on tolling and on investment. 
Allowing tolling by different governments will help to control congestion and 
generates resources for investments, but there is a fear of too high taxes on transit. 
When it comes to investment, the general idea is that, without federal help, 
investments in corridors that are used intensively by transit would be too low. 
Obviously both questions are linked: allowing tolling may help to overcome 
insufficient investment, but the net efficiency gain is not clear.   
 The approach we take focuses on models of interregional competition and 
considers various tolling or user charge possibilities for the governments involved. 
Specifically, the model set up contains two serial links where each of the links is 
controlled by one government1. The two links together form a corridor for transit 
traffic but each of the links is also used by local traffic. Both links are subject to 
congestion. We consider a two stage game where both governments set capacity in the 
first stage and play a Nash pricing game in the second stage. We follow De Borger, 
                                                 
1 Government stands here for a public body that represents faithfully the interests of the local voters. 
This can be a country government, a state government in a federation, or the officials of a smaller 
constituency like a city controlling a port.  
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Proost, Van Dender (2005) in explicitly distinguishing 3 pricing regimes: (i) tolls can 
be differentiated between transit and local users; (ii) only one uniform toll can be 
charged to local and transit traffic; and (iii) only local users can be charged.  
 This paper builds in a natural way on several strands of literature. First, a 
number of papers have considered pricing decisions for congested facilities, assuming 
a simple parallel network setting and excluding tax competition. In an early 
contribution, Braid (1986) studied Cournot and Bertrand pricing rules for congested 
facilities in a symmetric private duopoly setting. This work was extended in various 
directions. For example, Verhoef, Nijkamp, Rietveld (1996) considered competition 
between a private road and a free-access road, and compared the second-best optimal 
tolls with those obtained when both roads are privately owned. De Palma and Lindsey 
(2000) use a bottleneck model of congestion and compare three types of ownership 
structure: a private road competing with a free access road, two competing private 
roads, and competition between a private and a public operator. More recently, Van 
Dender (2005) highlighted the important distinction between facility-specific traffic 
(e.g., traffic to access a port or airport) and other traffic on the network (e.g., local 
traffic not using port or airport facilities). All these papers implicitly consider a 
parallel network structure, they do not deal with tax competition, and they ignore 
capacity competition.2 Second, De Borger et al. (2005) studied tax competition for 
transit transport in a simple network setting, assuming welfare-maximizing 
governments. However, unlike the current paper they focus on parallel networks and 
ignore the possibility of capacity investment as a strategic variable. Third, recent work 
looks specifically at tax exporting in the transport sector within a serial network 
setting. For example, Levinson (2001) analyses US States’ choice of instruments for 
financing transportation infrastructure. He shows that jurisdictions are more likely to 
opt for toll-financing instead of  fuel taxes, for example, when the share of non-
residential users is large.  His model does not include capacity decisions, however.  
Both De Palma and Leruth (1989) and De Borger and Van Dender (2005) do study 
two stage games in capacities and prices for parallel congested facilities. However, 
they do not look at issues of tax and capacity competition on a serial transport 
corridor. Moreover, they do not consider the range of pricing instruments nor the 
                                                 
2 Acemoglu and Ozdazgar (2005) recently provide a detailed theoretical analysis of competition and 
efficiency on parallel network markets. They show that more competition among oligopolists can 
reduce efficiency on congested markets. Moreover, pure strategy equilibria may not exist, especially 
when congestion functions are highly nonlinear. However, they do not consider capacity competition. 
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interaction between capacity choice and pricing regimes studied in the current paper. 
Finally, our model setting can be compared to the problem of airline alliances studied 
by Brueckner (2001). In an airline alliance, airlines cooperate in the international 
interhub (cross atlantic) markets, but the hubs are feeded and connected by local lines 
that are operated by each of the carriers. The alliance reduces competition on the 
interhub market but avoids the double margins on the feeding or connecting local 
lines. Compared to Brueckner’s paper, we concentrate on the serial network 
(forgetting the parallel interhub part) and we have congested infrastructure so that 
capacity decisions matter. Finally, we have local governments as decision makers 
rather than profit maximising airline operators.     
 A number of interesting results are obtained. First, if transit can be tolled we 
find that all tolls are inefficiently high. However, if only local traffic can be tolled, 
Nash equilibrium tolls are inefficiently low: tolls are shown to be smaller than the 
marginal external congestion cost imposed on local traffic. The reason is that higher 
local tolls would attract too much transit traffic and hence reduce welfare. Second, the 
pricing behavior for transit transport boils down to a variant of the double 
marginalization problem for successive monopolies in the industrial organization 
literature (see, e.g., Tirole (1993)). It is shown that reaction functions in transit tolls 
are negatively sloped, so that increasing the transit toll in one region by one euro 
raises the total toll on transit users for the whole trajectory by less than a euro. Third, 
at the capacity stage of the game, we show that capacity reaction functions are 
plausibly upward sloping: capacities are strategic complements. Fourth, we find that 
capacity changes strongly affect optimal tolling behavior. Higher capacity investment 
in a region not only lowers optimal tolls in this region under all pricing regimes, but it 
also increases tolls on transit in the other region. Moreover, there are interesting 
interactions between optimal capacities and the pricing instruments used: optimal 
capacity with differentiated tolls is higher than in the case of uniform tolls but welfare 
is lowest; the largest optimal capacity results when only local tolls are used. Fifth , if 
transit is sufficiently important, it may be welfare improving not to allow any tolling at all, 
or to only allow the tolling of locals. Sixth, it is well known that, in a tax competition 
setting (see Kanbur and Keen (1993)), the smaller country has an interest to go after 
the revenue objective. We find similar behaviour in the case of uniform tolls.  
The paper concentrates on cases where there is always some local and some 
transit traffic, but some extreme cases are interesting too. First, if there is no transit, 
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there is no strategic interaction and the first best solution can be achieved if all traffic 
can be tolled. Second, when transit is tolled but local demand is negligible, the two-
stage game reduces to a pure standard duopoly problem in which the optimal tolls on 
transit are both independent of the level of capacity and of the slope of the congestion 
function.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In a first section we describe the setup 
of the model. In Section 2 we look in detail at the pricing stage of the game. We 
study, for different tolling regimes, the countries’ optimal choice of transport tolls, 
conditional on given capacities and the tolls imposed on the other network link. We 
explicitly analyze the characteristics of the toll reaction functions and the resulting 
Nash equilibrium for the simplified case of linear demand and cost functions. Section 
3 deals with the first stage of the game, where regions decide on capacity, given the 
pricing behaviour at the second stage. In Section 4, we present some numerical results 
of the tax-capacity game to illustrate the main theoretical insights. We identify the 
welfare losses due to the lack of coordination between governments and we analyze 
the importance of three parameters: the share of transit, the slope of the congestion 
function and the relative size of the two countries.  Finally, Section 5 concludes with 
some generalisations and caveats. 
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1. Model structure 
 
 The simple setting we consider consists of two serial links; it is assumed that 
pricing of each link is the responsibility of a different government. We assume each 
link carries local traffic and transit traffic. Local traffic uses only the local link. 
Transit traffic, by definition, passes through the two links. Link capacities can be 
augmented through investments; however, once capacity is chosen, both links are 
potentially congestible. The distinction between the parallel network, analyzed in De 
Borger et al. (2005), and the serial setting considered in the current paper, is 
illustrated on Figure 1.  
  Both governments are assumed to maximise a local welfare function that 
reflects two concerns, viz. (i) the travel conditions of its local users and the associated 
welfare, and (ii) total tax revenues on the link it controls. Transit traffic is supposed to 
have its origin and destination outside the two-link network, so that the two 
governments are not interested in the transport costs and the welfare of transit traffic3. 
Finally, we assume that all traffic flows are uniformly distributed over time and are 
equal in both directions, allowing us to focus on one representative unit period and 
one direction.                                                                   
 
Country A
Country B
Country A Country B
TRANSIT
LOCAL
LOCAL
TRANSIT
LOCAL LOCAL
TRANSIT
TRANSIT
 
 Figure 1: Parallel versus serial competition 
                                                 
3 We could, for example, add local traffic originating in one of the countries that contributes to transit 
through the other country. This would imply a third category of traffic that reacts to the sum of the 
local toll and the transit toll abroad. This complicates matters but does not yield additional insights. 
 6 
 
 Turning to the specification of the model, demand for local transport in 
regions A and B is represented by the strictly downward sloping and twice 
differentiable inverse demand functions ( )YA AP Y  and ( )
Y
B BP Y , respectively, where AY  
and BY  are the local flows on both links. As is common in the transport literature, 
prices (.)jiP  are generalised prices including resource costs, time costs and tax 
payments or user charges. Similarly, overall demand for transit traffic is described by 
the strictly downward sloping inverse demand function ( )XP X , where X is the transit 
traffic flow that passes through both regions A and B. 
 Turning to the cost side, the generalised user cost for transit, denoted as Xg , 
equals the sum of the time and resource costs of travel plus the transit tolls in both  A 
and B:  
 
( ) ( )
with 
X
A A A A B B B B
i i i
g C V R C V R
V X Y
τ τ= + + +
= +  
In this expression, the (.)iC  are the time plus resource costs on link i, and iR  is the 
inverse of capacity4. The user cost function is twice differentiable and strictly 
increasing in i iV R , the total traffic volume relative to capacity. Making time costs a 
function of volume-capacity ratio is a common practice in transport economics5. The 
transit tolls are denoted iτ . Similarly, the generalised user cost functions for local use 
of links A and B are given by, respectively: 
 ( )
Y
A A A A Ag C V R t= + . 
 ( )YB B B B Bg C V R t= + . 
The it  are the tolls on local transport. 
 Transport equilibrium for transit and local traffic implies 
 
( ) ( ) ( )X X A A A A B B B BP X g C V R C V Rτ τ= = + + +                      (1)         
                                                 
4 A trick we borrowed from de Palma and Leruth (1989). 
5 See Small (1992) for a discussion of the congestion functions for different modes. In the industrial 
organisation literature an  ┘shaped congestion function is used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to 
show that a 2 stage capacity and price game gives the same results as a one stage Cournot game in 
quantities. Our model does not fit into this category because of the different shape of the congestion 
function and because of the difference in objective functions of the agents.  
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 ( ) ( )Y YA A A A A A AP Y g C V R t= = +    (2) 
 ( ) ( )Y YB B B B B B BP Y g C V R t= = +    (3) 
 
2. Strategic transport pricing in a serial corridor 
 
 In this section, we study the second stage of the tax-capacity game and focus 
on strategic pricing behaviour of the two governments, conditional on capacity levels. 
Here the methodology closely follows De Borger et al. (2005). Three different 
assumptions are made on the tolling instruments available: we consider the case 
where governments have access to differentiated tolls on local and transit traffic, we 
look at uniform tolls and, finally, we study the case where only local traffic can be 
tolled. In each case we first discuss the reduced-form demand system that expresses 
all demand functions as functions of the policy variables only. Next we derive the 
optimal tax rules for a given region. As the reaction functions and the resulting Nash 
equilibrium in taxes are rather cumbersome in general, we finally study strategic 
behaviour using linear demand and user cost functions. Throughout this section we 
only report the main insights; technical details are provided in appendices. 
 
2.1 The case of differentiated tolls 
 
2.1.1. The reduced-form demand system 
 
 We start from the equilibrium conditions (1), (2) and (3) given above. This 
system can easily be solved for the three transport volumes demanded as functions of 
the four tax rates and the two capacity levels: 
    ( , , , , , )r A B A B A BX X t t R Rτ τ=         
    
( , , , , , )
( , , , , , )
r
A A A B A B A B
r
B B A B A B A B
Y Y t t R R
Y Y t t R R
τ τ
τ τ
=
=        
These reduced-form demand functions are an interesting short-cut because they 
already incorporate feedback effects of congestion on demand. This is the reason why 
any tax change of one of the governments affects all the transport flows, including 
local traffic flows abroad.  
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 Unless otherwise noted we limit our analysis to the domain where all flows are 
strictly positive6. In Appendix 1 we show that the demand function for transit 
transport has the following properties:     
    
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A B A B
r r
A B
X X X X
t t
X X
R R
τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂< < > >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂< <∂ ∂
          (4)  
Expression (4) implies that higher transit taxes in an arbitrary region reduce overall 
transit demand and, as higher local taxes in any given region reduce congestion, they 
raise transit demand. Higher investment in capacity in either country raises transit 
demand.  
 Similarly, the reduced-form demand for local transport in region A has the 
following characteristics (again, see Appendix 1): 
                                
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A A A A
A B A B
r r
A A
A B
Y Y Y Y
t t
Y Y
R R
τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂> > < <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂
   (5) 
This shows that transit taxes reduce transit demand and hence congestion, raising 
local demands, whereas local taxes reduce local demand.  Moreover, raising capacity 
abroad in B attracts more transit, increases congestion and, as a consequence, 
decreases local traffic in A. Finally, a local capacity increase in A raises local traffic 
demand in this region.  
 
2.1.2. Optimal toll rules 
 
 We focus on region A. Consider the problem of determining the tolls on local 
and transit traffic that maximizes local welfare, conditional on the existing capacities 
in both regions and taking tax levels in B as given. Region A solves: 
                                  
,
0
1( ( ))
A
A A
Y
Y Y
A A A A A A A At
A
Max W P y dy g Y t Y X K
Rτ
τ= − + + −∫ .          (6)
     
                                                 
6 This assumption is necessary to guarantee differentiable demand functions. 
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where AK is the constant unit rental cost of capacity
7, and the demand functions are the 
reduced-form demands just described. We show in Appendix 1 that the first-order 
conditions with respect to At and Aτ imply the following tax rules: 
                 ' '( )A A A A A A At Y X C R LMEC XC R= + = +                        (7)                       
                                         
r
A
A
A A r
A
A A
Y
tLMEC X
z X
t
τ
τ
 ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂  ∂ ∂ 
                                   (8)            
where 'A A A ALMEC Y C R= is the local marginal external cost and ( , , )A A Az X R t  stands 
for the (non reduced) demand function for local traffic. The local marginal external 
cost is the extra congestion cost imposed on local road users by one extra car on the 
link. These tax rules have the same structure as in the parallel network case (De 
Borger et al. (2005)) although, see below, they imply very different strategic tolling 
behaviour. The reduced-form demand derivatives given in (7)-(8) imply that both 
taxes exceed local marginal external cost. Moreover, in Appendix 1 we show that the 
transit tax exceeds the local tax. These results imply tax exporting (taxing transit at a 
higher rate than local demand) and tax competition (taxing a common tax base 
without any regard to the effects on the other region’s revenue). The latter yields tolls 
on local traffic above marginal cost to reduce congestion and attract more transit.    
 
  
2.1.3. Tax reaction functions for linear demand and cost functions  
 
 Note that (7)-(8) implicitly describe region A’s reaction functions: they give 
optimal taxes for given tax rates in B, at given capacity levels in both regions. To 
study some of the properties of these reaction functions and to get insight into 
regions’ strategic behaviour, we simplify the analysis by assuming linear demand and 
cost functions. Let transit and local demands be given by, respectively: 
                                         
( )
( )
( )
, , , , , 0
X
Y
A A A A A
Y
B B B B B
A A B B
P X a bX
P Y c d Y
P Y c d Y
with a b c d c d
= −
= −
= −
>
                                                  
                                                 
7 We assume constant returns to scale in capacity, an assumption more justified for road than for rail. 
We return to this assumption in our concluding section. 
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Cost functions for transport time (and resources) are specified as: 
 
* *
( ) * ( )
( ) * ( )
,
, 0
A A A A A
B B B B B
A A A B B B
C X Y X Y
C X Y X Y
where R R
and
α β
α β
β β β β
α β
+ = + +
+ = + +
= =
>
 
Note that demands and costs are linear in generalized prices and transport volumes, 
respectively. The cost function assumes that congestion is determined by the ratio of 
the traffic flow relative to capacity (remember that the ( , )kR k A B= are inverse 
capacities). The formulation in terms of the β* is convenient because at the pricing 
stage of the game we hold capacities constant. 
 In Appendix 1 we show that the toll reaction functions for region A that 
follows from these specifications can be written as: 
   1
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
B
A A B Bc z t
ττ τ= − −  
   1
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
t A B A
A A B Bt c L z L tτ= + +  
where the parameters Ac
τ , tAc , 1
Bz and AL  are all rather complex functions of demand 
and cost parameters. Note that 1
Bz  (which is negative, see Appendix 1) gives the effect 
of an exogenous increase in transit transport in region B on the demand for local 
transport in that region. Moreover, we have 1 0AL− < < . 
 Interpretation of the signs of taxes in region B on optimal taxes in A is then 
clear. We find that an increase in the transit tax in B induces region A to optimally 
reduce both its transit tax and the tax on local traffic. The higher tax on transit in B 
reduces transit demand and hence reduces congestion in A. The optimal response in A 
is therefore to reduce both taxes. Similarly, a higher local tax in B induces region A to 
optimally raise transit as well as local taxes in A. The higher local tax in B reduces 
congestion in B, and attracts more transit. This also raises congestion in A. Therefore, 
country A raises its tax rates on all traffic on its territory.  
 Note that, despite the very different setting, the structure of the reaction 
functions bears some close resemblance to well-known results in industrial 
organisation. For example, it implies that an increase in the transit toll in one region is 
partially compensated by a reduction in the transit toll imposed by the other region. 
More specifically, a one euro toll increase on transit in B induces region A to reduce 
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its toll by 0.5 euro, so that the overall transit toll for the whole trajectory rises by 0.5 
euro only. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the pricing behaviour of successive 
monopolies, where in the case of linear demands and costs a cost increase by one unit 
raises the final price by exactly 0.5 euro (see Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), Tirole 
(1993)).     
 Together with the equivalent expressions for B, we have four reaction 
functions that can be solved for the Nash equilibrium in taxes. We denote this 
solution, which depends on the capacity levels, as 
( , ), ( , ), ,NE NEk A B k A BR R t R R k A Bτ = . Unfortunately, despite the simplicity of the 
model (linear demands and costs), the expression that describes the partial effects of 
capacities on Nash equilibrium taxes are cumbersome, and even the signs of these 
derivatives are hard to determine analytically. Intuitively, one expects a capacity 
increases in A to reduce Nash equilibrium taxes in A, because of lower congestion 
(although it also implies extra revenue-raising capacity). A capacity increase in B 
raises congestion in A and is therefore likely to raise taxes in A. We expect, therefore: 
   0, 0, 0, 0
NE NE NE NE
A A A A
A A B B
t t
R R R R
τ τ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂> > < <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
Numerical analysis, see Section 4, confirms these signs. 
 
 
2.2. The case of uniform tolls  
 
 The procedure to derive the reduced-form demand system is entirely 
analogous to the differentiated tolling case; the only difference is that we set the local 
toll ( , )kt k A B= and the transit toll ( , )k k A Bτ = equal. We denote the uniform tolls 
by ( , )k k A Bθ = . Derivations are summarized in Appendix 2. There we determine the 
following signs for the partial effects of the uniform taxes and capacity changes on 
transit demand ( , , , )r A B A BX X R Rθ θ= : 
 0
r
A
X
θ
∂ <∂ ,  
0
r
B
X
θ
∂ <∂      
     0
r
A
X
R
∂ <∂ , 0
r
B
X
R
∂ <∂                      
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Both tax rates reduce transit demand. Capacity increases raise demand for transit. 
Similarly, we have the following partial effects for the local demand function 
( , , , )rA A A B A BY Y R Rθ θ= :  
                          
0, 0
0, 0
r r
A A
A B
r r
A A
A B
Y Y
Y Y
R R
θ θ
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂
  
A higher tax rate in A reduces local demand in A; an increase in the tax rate abroad 
reduces transit demand and, hence, raises local demand in A. Capacity increases in A 
(B) raise (reduce) local demand in A.    
 The optimal uniform tax can be written as, see Appendix 2.   
   
A A r r
A
A A
XLMEC
Y X
θ
θ θ
= − ∂ ∂+∂ ∂
 
Noting the signs derived before, it follows that the tax rate exceeds the local marginal 
external cost. The difference positively depends on the importance of transit. 
 Finally, in the linear demand and cost case, the reaction function for region A 
can be written as (see Appendix 2): 
   AA A Bc m
θθ θ= +  
where Am <0. This shows that the reaction function is downward sloping. A higher 
tax in B reduces transit demand through both regions, reducing congestion in A. This 
induces this region to reduce its uniform tax. 
 Nash equilibrium taxes are denoted by ( , )NEk A BR Rθ , ,k A B= . Again, the 
derivatives of these tax expressions with respect to capacities are not easily 
determined, even for the linear case. However, one expects:    
   0, 0
NE NE
A A
A BR R
θ θ∂ ∂> <∂ ∂   
Higher capacity in A reduces congestion and hence one expects lower taxes. More 
capacity in B attracts more traffic to A and suggests higher taxes. Numerical analysis 
confirms this intuition; see Section 4.  
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2.3. The case of local tolls only  
 
 The case of local tolls only is analyzed in detail in Appendix 3. The 
derivatives of the reduced-form demand functions with respect to the local tolls are 
identical to those for the differentiated tolling case. Indeed, the only difference is that 
the transit toll is set to zero. The optimal local toll is shown to be given by:  
 1
r
A
A A r
A
A
X
tt LMEC
Y
t
 ∂ ∂ = + ∂  ∂ 
 
where, importantly, the term between square brackets is between zero and one. This 
implies that the optimal tax is positive but smaller than the local marginal external 
cost. Finally, in the linear demand and cost cases, reaction functions are found to be 
linear and downward sloping: a higher local tax in B reduces local demand but attracts 
more transit, which passes through both A and B. Hence, congestion in A rises, 
reducing local traffic demand in A. This reduces the local marginal external cost so 
that country A reduces its tax rate on local demand. The intuition is that by doing so, 
country A raises local demand and thus congestion, which is the only way to reduce 
transit through its territory.  
 Note that in this case expectations on the partial effects of capacity changes on 
tolling behaviour are not obvious. More capacity in A attracts more transit, which 
remains un-tolled. To the extent that the capacity increase yields less congestion one 
expects the region to set a lower tax; this is confirmed in our numerical illustrations in 
section 4.      
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 3. Strategic capacity choices: the first stage of the game 
 
 In this section we study the capacity competition game, taking into account the 
implications of capacity choices for pricing behaviour derived in the previous section. 
Given the complexity of strategic capacity choices and its interaction with pricing at 
the second stage, the capacity game of this general case does not yield transparent 
theoretical results. To get some preliminary insights on the nature of capacity 
interaction between the two links we therefore start out by briefly considering some 
special cases, viz. capacity competition in the absence of local traffic (subsection 3.1) 
and the case where tolls are not used at all (subsection 3.2). This second case allows 
us to exclusively focus on strategic capacity choices. Moreover, it is not uninteresting 
in its own right, because in some European countries within the EU, congestion tolls 
are indeed not used at all. The general case where both tolls and capacities are 
strategically used is considered in subsection 3.3. Throughout we focus on linear 
demands and costs.  
 
3.1. Capacity competition without local traffic 
  
 Consider first the special case of zero local demand. Since transit welfare does 
not enter the local welfare function there is no congestion externality, and the 
objective function of each region simply consists in maximizing the transit tax 
revenues minus capacity costs. It is easily shown that the pricing solution then boils 
down to the standard private duopoly result (Tirole (1993), Gibbons (1992)). We find 
that the only Nash equilibrium in tolls: (i) is symmetric, even if the free-flow cost 
parameters differ; (ii) is independent of capacities, and (iii) is independent of the slope 
of the congestion function. Moreover, the capacity reaction functions are 
unambiguously positively sloped.  
 
3.2. Capacity competition when congestion tolls are not used 
 
 If tolls are not used at all, the optimal capacity choice problem of the country 
government reduces to:                                    
   
0
1( ( ))
A
A
Y
Y Y
A A A A AR
A
Max W P y dy g Y K
R
= − −∫              (9) 
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The first-order condition is given by: 
   2
Y
A A
A
A A
g KY
R R
∂ =∂                  (10) 
Using the definition of the generalized cost for the linear case, it can be written in 
implicit form as: 
   2( , ) ( ) 0
r r
A A
A B A A A A A A
A A A
Y KXR R V Y R Y
R R R
ψ β β ∂ ∂= + + − =∂ ∂           (11) 
Expression (11) implicitly describes the reaction function in capacity for region A. In 
Appendix 4 we show that its slope is highly plausibly positive so that, when tolls are 
not used at all, capacities in the two regions will be strategic complements The 
intuition is clear. Suppose region B raises capacity. This attracts more transit through 
both A and B so that, in order to dampen the negative welfare effect on local demand, 
country A reacts by also raising capacity. Of course, when tolls can be used as well, 
the increase in capacity also affects tolling behavior at the second stage, and our 
conjecture of positively sloped reaction functions may have to be amended. 
   
 
3.3. Tax-capacity competition: the general case 
  
 The general case is complex due to the nonlinearities in the capacity reaction 
functions and the interaction with the pricing game. As an example, take the case of 
differentiated tolling. Optimal capacity at the first stage of the game is defined 
implicitly by the first order condition for a maximum of the local welfare function 
defined in (6), taking into account the dependency of optimal Nash equilibrium taxes 
at the second stage of the game on capacity.  
 The first-order condition of maximizing (6) with respect to inverse capacity in 
A can, using the equality between generalized price and cost, be written as: 
 2
rY r NE NE
A A A A A
A A A A
A A A A A A
dXdg dY t KY t Y X
dR dR dR R R R
ττ ∂ ∂− − − − =∂ ∂                                        (12)           
Interpretation of (12) is conceptually simple. The right hand side reflects the capacity 
cost savings realised by a decrease in capacity. The left hand side gives the increase in 
user cost for local traffic (first term on the left hand side) and the change in tax 
revenues (other left hand side terms) caused by the decrease in capacity. Note that in 
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(12) all taxes are evaluated at their Nash equilibrium values, and the total derivatives 
capture direct capacity effects and indirect effects via tax adjustments:  
   ( )
Y r r NE
A A A
A A A
A A A A
dg dY dX tV R
dR dR dR R
β   ∂= + + +  ∂   
   
, ,
NE NEr r r r
k kA A A A
k A B k A BA A k A k A
tdY Y Y Y
dR R t R R
τ
τ= =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑  
   
, ,
NE NEr r r r
k k
k A B k A BA A k A k A
tdX X X X
dR R t R R
τ
τ= =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑ ∑  
   
 The first-order condition (12) can be simplified by substituting the above total 
derivatives and using the first-order conditions for optimal taxation in region A. These 
could be written (see Appendix 1) 
   
( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( ) 0
r r
A
A A A A A A A A
A A
r r
A
A A A A A A A A
A A
Y Xt Y R Y R
t t
Y Xt Y R Y R X
β τ β
β τ βτ τ
∂ ∂− + − =∂ ∂
∂ ∂− + − + =∂ ∂
 
Using these results in (12), and noting the definition of the local marginal external 
cost, we find that the optimal capacity rule in region A can be written as: 
 
2
( )
( )
r r NE r NE
B B
A A A A A
A B A B A
r r NE r NE
A A B A B A
A A
A B A B A A
X X t XV Y LMEC
R t R R
Y Y t Y Kt LMEC
R t R R R
τβ τ τ
τ
τ
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + +  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + =  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
            (13) 
The left hand side captures all welfare effects of demand changes induced by 
capacity: the first term is the direct user cost increase of capacity changes at constant 
demand, the second and third terms represent the net welfare effects via induced 
demand changes. These terms are the product of the total demand change (direct and 
indirect via tax adjustments in the other region) and the deviation of taxes and local 
marginal external costs. Observe that tax adjustments in A do not appear in this 
expression, because taxes in A have been determined optimally.  
 A special case is when no transit traffic exists. In that case the optimal local 
toll equals the local marginal congestion costs, and the left hand side of (13) reduces 
to the first term only: the direct costs of a reduction of capacity. We then obtain a first 
best result because there is no strategic interaction between both governments. 
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 Expression (13) implicitly describes the reaction function in capacities for the 
first stage of the game. Unfortunately, determining the sign of the slope of this 
reaction function is difficult because demands and Nash equilibrium taxes are all 
highly nonlinear in capacity. We did not attempt to do so, but will rely on numerical 
analysis below. The numerical results do confirm that capacity reaction functions are 
plausibly upward sloping in the general case as well. 
 For completeness sake, consider the other pricing regimes. In the case of 
uniform taxes the first-order condition can be rewritten as (see Appendix 5): 
 2( )
r r r r NE
A A A A B A
A A A A A
A A B B A A
Y X Y X KV Y LMEC
R R R R
θβ θ θ θ
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + =  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
         (14) 
Interpretation is as before. The first term represents the direct effect of increasing user 
costs for local traffic. The second term represents the induced losses of local and 
transit traffic multiplied by the net tax margin (Tax minus local marginal external 
costs).  
 Finally, for local tolls only we can derive (see Appendix 5 for derivation) the 
following optimal capacity condition:   
2( )
r r NE r r NE
A A B B A
A A A A A A
A B A A B A A
Y Y t X X t KV Y t LMEC LMEC
R t R R t R R
β    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + =   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂           (15) 
We again see a first term that represents direct user cost losses of a reduction of 
capacity. The second term represents the change in welfare of induced local traffic 
that does not pay its external congestion cost. The third term represents the gain in 
welfare when under-priced transit traffic decreases as a result of a decrease in 
capacity.  
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4. A numerical illustration 
 
 This section illustrates the results using numerical simulation analysis. We 
first explain the calibration of the no toll reference equilibrium for the symmetric case 
with identical regions (subsection 4.1). Next we discuss the outcomes of the first stage 
of the game, i.e., the Nash equilibrium tolls for given capacities under the three 
different pricing regimes (subsection 4.2). Then the results of the complete two-stage 
pricing and capacity game are considered (subsection 4.3). Moreover, the importance 
of transit and of the slope of the congestion function for the results is highlighted. 
Finally, we conclude this section by discussing the role of the relative size of the two 
countries (subsection 4.4). 
 
4.1 Calibration of the reference case 
 
 Assume initially that the two regions are ex ante symmetric. Moreover, the no 
toll reference case is constructed such that local and transit demand each account for 
50% of total traffic in a given region. Local and transit demand each amount to 1300 
trips per time unit. Capacity was set at 2000 in each region; which implies the 
reference value for inverse capacities 0.0005A BR R= = 8.  
 The zero toll equilibrium was used as the reference situation to calibrate the 
parameters of the model. In other words, all parameters (demand function parameters, 
slope of the congestion function, the capacity cost, etc.) were calibrated so that the 
parameters reproduced the zero toll Nash equilibrium consistent with the transport 
volumes and capacities assumed. The set of parameters that resulted from the 
calibration procedure is reproduced in Appendix 6.  
 
 
4.2. Optimal pricing at given capacities: the pricing stage of the game 
 
 In Table 1 we report results for the pricing game at fixed capacities. We 
consecutively report 5 different equilibria: the no toll situation to which the 
parameters were calibrated, three Nash equilibrium outcomes (differentiated tolls, 
                                                 
8 Note that these  capacity levels are chosen so that, in the absence of tolling, they reflect the optimal 
values for each of the countries, given the cost of capacity. This will become important when we 
endogenize the choice of capacity. 
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uniform tolls, local toll only) and the centralized solution. The centralized solution 
reflects the optimal policies when the two-link serial transport corridor would be 
operated by one welfare maximizing government.     
 Results indicate the following. First, the equilibrium with tax differentiation 
yields very high taxes on transit; this follows from the fact that transit yields no 
benefits except tax revenues to the individual regions. The consequence is a drastic 
reduction in transit transport. Welfare of the individual countries rises substantially: 
despite the toll on local transport the generalized cost of local transport only increases 
slightly; this is due to the lower time cost associated with much lower transit demand. 
Of course, the welfare increase in the two countries is due to the fact that the welfare 
of transit traffic is not incorporated into the countries’ individual welfare functions. 
Incorporating the reduction in welfare for transit, which is almost wiped out, implies 
that total welfare declines compared to no tolls at all. Second, in the case of uniform 
taxes we observe taxes substantially exceeding local marginal external costs, yielding 
a reduction in countries’ individual welfare compared to the tax differentiation case. 
Third, if only local tolls are optimized we see, consistent with the prediction from the 
theoretical sections, taxes that are (slightly) below local marginal external cost. 
Interestingly, in this case not only is the countries’ individual welfare higher than in 
the reference case, but even accounting for transit welfare this solution improves 
overall welfare. Transit is obviously better off because it is not tolled and local 
transport is, reducing congestion. Finally, the centralized optimal solution yields a 
uniform toll of about 30% the level at the uniform toll Nash equilibrium; it leads to 
higher regional welfare as well as overall welfare.  
 Of course, the results are highly sensitive to the importance of transit in the 
initial equilibrium. Calibrating the model for a 10% share of transit in the reference 
situation, we find that all symmetric Nash equilibria, except the differentiated tolling 
case, improve overall welfare. Moreover, uniform tolls are much lower than before.   
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4.3. Strategic capacity choices and pricing  
 
 In this subsection we turn to the complete capacity-pricing game. First we 
illustrate the impact of capacity changes on optimal tolling behaviour; next we discuss 
the results of the full solution to the two-stage game. 
   
4.3.1. Exogenous capacity adjustments and optimal tolling behaviour 
 
 Note that in the theoretical sections it proved difficult to produce clear-cut 
analytical results for the signs of the partial derivatives of taxes with respect to 
capacities: 
    , ( , )
NE NE
k k
A A
t k A B
R R
τ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ , ( , )
NE
k
A
k A B
R
θ∂ =∂  ,  ( , )
NE
k
A
t k A B
R
∂ =∂    
We therefore first illustrate the effect of increasing capacity on Nash equilibrium 
taxes. Given fixed inverse capacities, RA and RB, and assuming linear demand and cost 
curves, we can solve the pricing game analytically to determine the variables 
, , , , ,A B A B AX Y Y t t τ  and Bτ  as functions of the inverse capacities.  This has been done 
for the three tax regimes: differentiated tolls, uniform tolls and local tolls only. We 
can then evaluate these expressions for various values of capacity in a given region, 
say A, holding all other variables and parameters constant. In all other respects 
countries A and B are treated as identical.  
 We summarize the results in Figure 2, where we concentrate on two cases: 
uniform tolls and local tolls only. Consider the uniform tolling case. The figure shows 
the effect of capacity changes in country A on the optimal uniform taxes of both 
regions. In the initial situation where the capacities in A and B are identical we have a 
Nash equilibrium with uniform tolls equal to 104 in both regions. Halving capacity in 
A increases the uniform toll in A but forces B to reduce its toll slightly. The elasticity 
of the Nash tolls with respect to a capacity change in A is in absolute terms twice as 
large for the toll in A than for the toll in B. This reaction is confirmed if we cut 
capacity by half once more and arrive at tolls of 124 in A and 91 in B. The exogenous 
lowering of capacity in A increases the local marginal external congestion cost and 
this is an important ingredient of the optimal uniform tax in A. Country B now faces a 
transit demand with a lower residual willingness to pay and is forced to cut its 
uniform tolls in order to protect its revenues. With the exogenous decrease in 
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transport capacity in A, transit demand will decrease, local demand in country A will 
contract strongly while local demand in country B will expand as a result of less 
transit. The same profile of reactions can be found in the differentiated tolling case 
(not shown on Figure 2): an exogenous reduction of capacity in A will increase the 
local tax and transit tax at home and will decrease the local and transit tax in B.  
When only local demand can be tolled, an exogenous reduction of capacity in 
A will reduce the local toll in A (see Figure 2, lower left corner). An important 
difference with the uniform case is that the tax on local traffic in B now stays 
approximately constant. This can be explained by the fact that the risk of increasing 
congestion caused by higher transit traffic, due to capacity reductions and increased 
tolls in A, is much less severe than in the uniform toll or differentiated toll case.  
103,87
112,06
123,73θA
tA
Nash equilibria uniform toll
tB, θB
Exogenous doublings of
Capacity in A 
14,12
22,96
31,83
Nash equilibria
Local tolls only
Exogenous doublings of 
Capacity in A 
 
Figure 2: Shifts in Nash equilibria for uniform tolls and differentiated tolls as a 
result of exogenous changes in the transport capacity in A. 
 
4.3.2. Strategic tolling and capacity choices on a transport corridor 
 
 Some results for the complete two-stage game are summarized in Table 2. 
First, consider the implications of the different pricing regimes for the optimal 
capacity choice in equilibrium. We observe that, compared to the no-toll capacity of 
2000, optimal capacities decline for all three tolling regimes. This is not surprising. 
The no-toll equilibrium was calibrated such that the observed capacity was optimal in 
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the Nash equilibrium, and the use of tolls reduces overall transport demand in each 
country. One therefore expects that capacity is lower than when no tolls are charged. 
Note that the capacity reduction strongly differs with the tolling regime in place. 
Optimal capacity is smallest when regions compete on the basis of uniform tolls; in 
that case high uniform tolls to tackle congestion lead to strong reductions in demand 
and, hence, low capacities. The optimal capacity is much larger when regions only use 
local tolls. In that case high transit demand implies a relatively small demand 
reduction compared to the no-toll equilibrium; capacity is much higher than with tolls 
on transit as a consequence. The case of differentiated tolls takes up an intermediate 
position: capacity is somewhat higher than in the uniform toll case. Transit demand is 
low, but local demand is much higher than with uniform tolls.   
 Second, note that the optimal tolls on local transport are, for all tolling 
regimes, higher than in the case capacity could not be optimally chosen. This is not 
surprising, because we showed in the previous subsection that capacity reductions at 
the first stage of the game induce regions to raise tolls on local transport at the second 
stage. Capacity reductions raise congestion, giving rise to higher taxes on local 
demand. The optimal toll on transit slightly declines in comparison with the case of 
fixed capacity. It is the joint effect of capacity expansions in the own region and in the 
competing region.       
 In Table 1, we have seen that, when transit is sufficiently important, allowing 
individual countries to toll actually reduces overall welfare, except for the case where 
countries can only toll local traffic. The intuition for this result is clear: a country will 
only toll its home traffic if its local consumer surplus plus tax revenue on locals 
increases, and any tax increase on local traffic benefits transit through lower 
congestion. So for the case of local tolls only, toll incentives are compatible with 
overall welfare. Interestingly, in Table 2 we see that this result still holds when we 
include capacity choice. In all cases, when tolling is introduced, it becomes interesting 
to reduce the overall capacity level, which will affect transit welfare negatively. 
However, for the case of local tolls only, this does not outweigh the benefit received 
from tolling local traffic.  
 Finally, note that we have only considered the case where transit and local 
demand make up 50% each of total transport in a given region. It is clear that tolling 
behaviour and capacity choices may be substantially affected by assuming different 
shares of transit. A share of only 10% transit in the no toll Nash equilibrium is 
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analysed in Table 3; the two regions are still assumed to be symmetric. This case has 
the same total demand function, the same congestion function and the same unit 
capacity cost as the previous 50%-50% case discussed in Table 2.   
 Results from comparing Tables 2 and 3 are as follows. The optimal uniform 
tolls in the 10% transit case are substantially lower than in the 50%-50% case, despite 
the increase in local marginal external cost. This follows from the decreased tendency 
for tax exporting behaviour. In the case of local tolls only, the Nash equilibrium local 
toll in Table 3 is higher than in Table 2, and it hardly differs from the (higher) local 
marginal external cost; this again reflects the lower importance of transit. Relative 
capacity reductions in the differentiated and uniform tolling cases are also slightly 
smaller in the case with low transit shares. This is due to the fact that the benefits of 
capacity provision are enjoyed to a larger extent by local traffic. Finally, note that the 
centralized solution in the 10% transit case yields the same optimal tolls and capacity 
levels as in the 50%-50% case considered in Table 2; this follows from our 
assumption of identical total demand and congestion functions.  
 We further also checked the sensitivity of the symmetric results by increasing 
the slope of the congestion function (β) by 20%. We found (these results are not 
shown) that this implies higher optimal capacities, higher tolls and lower volumes; 
moreover, and that it does not alter the welfare ranking of the five capacity-price 
equilibria we study.  
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4.4 Role of relative country size 
 
 In this subsection we illustrate the role of asymmetries in country size. It is 
well known in the tax competition literature (see Kanbur and Keen (1993)) that, in a 
cross border context, the small country has a larger incentive to undercut the tax rate 
of its neighbour. This typically holds for cigarettes or gasoline. The intuition is that 
the big country loses more revenue by lowering taxes because it can never gain 
abroad what it loses at home. Our context is different in two respects. Firstly, the 
country governments we analyze are by assumption maximizers of local welfare 
rather than pure revenue maximizers. Secondly, the transit tax base is the same for 
both countries and does not shift from one country to another like the demand for 
sigarettes would do. 
 In Tables 4 and 5 we report the results of the capacity and price competition 
for the case where a corridor runs through two different countries. The first one is a 
“small” country where, in the absence of tolling,  transit is as important as local traffic 
(similar  to our 50%  transit case of Table 2); the second country is a “large” country 
where, in the absence of tolling, transit is only 10% of total traffic (similar to the 90%, 
10% case of Table 3). Because the transit traffic is the same in the small and the large 
country, the large country has a higher total demand than the small country. As the 
cost of capacity is kept constant, the slope of the congestion function in the large 
country has been increased to have the same generalised cost in the no toll 
equilibrium.  
 The behaviour of both countries depends now strongly on the type of tolling 
instrument that is available. We see that in the Nash differentiated toll case, both 
countries charge high tolls on transit and we have the same double marginalisation 
problem as in the symmetric case. When only uniform tolls are available, the 
behaviour of the small and large country are very different. The small country A now 
has an interest to favour the revenue motive and accept inefficient pricing for its local 
users, while the large country gives much higher weight to the local users. In the local 
tolls only case, we have again fairly similar results for both countries. In terms of 
overall welfare (small + large country), the ranking of the solutions is similar to the 
symmetric case. Worst is the tax discrimination case, followed by the uniform case, 
the no toll case and the local tolls only case. It is interesting to note that the small 
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country can spoil the welfare gains the large country could generate with a uniform 
tax. In the symmetric 10% transit case, shown in Table 3, the uniform solution was 
better than the no tolling case. This is no longer true here because the small country 
has in a serial network a strong incentive to abuse its monopoly power. 
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5. Summary and caveats 
 
 In this paper we have analyzed the strategic behaviour of country governments 
that each operate one individual link of a congested transport corridor. We studied a 
two stage game in capacities and prices under three different pricing regimes.  
 The conclusions are easily summarized. With respect to optimal tolling 
behavior we showed that, when transit can be tolled, strategic behavior implies that a 
unit increase in the transit toll in one region raises the total toll on transit users for the 
whole trajectory by less than one unit. Moreover, transit tolls are inefficiently high. 
However, if only local traffic can be tolled, Nash equilibrium tolls are inefficiently 
low: tolls are shown to be smaller than the marginal external congestion cost imposed 
on local traffic. The reason is that higher local tolls would attract too much transit 
traffic and hence reduce welfare.  
 At the capacity stage of the game, we showed that capacities in the two 
regions are likely to be strategic complements: reaction functions are plausibly 
upward sloping so that higher capacity on one link of the corridor induces the operator 
of the other link to invest in capacity as well. Moreover, we find that capacity changes 
strongly affect optimal tolling behavior. Higher capacity investment in a region not 
only lowers optimal tolls in this region under all pricing regimes, but it also affects 
tolls on transit in the other region. We further find interesting interactions between 
optimal capacities and the pricing instruments used: optimal capacity with 
differentiated tolls is higher than in the case of uniform tolls; the largest optimal 
capacity results when only local tolls are used. Finally, we emphasized the role of the 
share of transit and of asymmetric country sizes for the results.    
 Although the analysis was based on a very simple model, it may have potential 
applicability in a number of cases where capacity and pricing decisions in regions are 
strategically chosen. This includes investment and pricing on Trans European 
Networks (basically a border-crossing highway system) in Europe and the interstate 
highway system in the US. Moreover, it is equally relevant for pricing and investment 
decisions for long distance rail trips, and with minor adaptation the analysis also 
applies to inter-modal freight trips where the transfer facility (ports, airports, freight 
terminal) and the upstream or downstream infrastructure is controlled by different 
governments. 
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 Several avenues for extension could be considered. One is to generalise the 
results for transport corridors through n (rather than just 2) countries. Another is to 
explore the implications of relaxing the assumption of constant returns in capacity 
expansion. A third extension could be to integrate the results for serial networks with 
those obtained for parallel networks. A fourth extension would be to pay specific 
attention to the timing of the game with, say, one country leading in the capacity 
extension. A further extension would be to examine a cooperative process. Finally, 
one could examine other assumptions on the behaviour of the countries’ decision 
makers and explicitly develop some of the political economy aspects of tax and 
capacity decisions.  
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Appendix 1: The case of differentiated tolls 
 
In this appendix we derive the most relevant results for the differentiated tolling case. 
The procedure is the same as in De Borger et al (2005) but requires some adjustment 
for the particular serial setting considered here.  
 
Characteristics of the reduced-form demands 
 We start from the equilibrium conditions: 
             ( ) ( ) ( )X A A A A B B B BP X C V R C V Rτ τ= + + +         (A1.1)                     
 ( ) ( )YA A A A A AP Y C V R t= +          (A1.2)                              
 ( ) ( )YB B B B B BP Y C V R t= +          (A1.3)  
Noting that k AV Y X= + , first solve the two last equations for local transport as a 
function of transit demand, the local tax rate and capacity in a given region: 
    ( , , )A A A AY z X R t=                              (A1.4)
             ( , , )B B B BY z X R t=               (A1.5) 
Application of the implicit function theorem to (A1.2) implies: 
   
'
'
0A A AY
A
A A
A
z C R
PX R C
Y
∂ = <∂∂ −∂
       (A1.6)
   
'
1 0A Y
AA
A A
A
z
Pt R C
Y
∂ = <∂∂ −∂
              (A1.7) 
'
'
0A A AY
AA
A A
A
z V C
PR R C
Y
∂ = <∂∂ −∂
    (A1.8) 
where ( )'
( )
A A A
A
A A
C V R
C
V R
∂= ∂ . 
 An analogous result is derived for B. Interpretation is simple: an exogenous 
increase in transit reduces the demand for local transport, as it raises local congestion 
and hence generalised user cost.  Raising the local tax, at a given transit level, reduces 
local demand for transport. Finally, increasing capacity (decreasing R), increases the 
local transport flow. 
 Note that (A1.6) implies that, for k=A,B: 
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'
(1 ) 0
Y
k
k k
Y
k
k k
k
P
z Y
PX C R
Y
∂
∂ ∂+ = >∂∂ −∂
      (A1.9) 
Moreover, substituting (A1.4)-(A1.5) into (A1.1) yields: 
  
  [ ] [ ]( ) ( ( , )), ( ( , )),X A A A A A B B B B BP X C X z X t R C X z X t Rτ τ= + + + + +  
                                                         
Solution of this expression for transit demand X yields the reduced form demand for 
transit as a function of all four tax rates. Using the implicit function theorem we 
derive the following results for A (analogous results hold for B): 
 
   '1 AA A
A A
zdX C R
dt t
 ∂= −  ∆ ∂ 
         (A1.10)        
 1
A
dX
dτ = − ∆                                          (A1.11)                              
'1 B
B B
B B
zdX C R
dt t
 ∂= −  ∆ ∂ 
                                     (A1.12)                       
   1
B
dX
dτ = − ∆                                 (A1.13)                  
' '1 A
A A A A
A A
zdX C V C R
dR R
 ∂= − + ∆ ∂ 
    (A1.14) 
' '1 B
B B B B
B B
zdX C V C R
dR R
 ∂= − + ∆ ∂ 
          (A1.15) 
where   
                               ' '(1 ) (1 )
X
A B
A A B B
z zP C R C R
X X X
 ∂ ∂∂∆ = − − + − + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
Using (A1.9) immediately yields 0∆ > . Since simple algebra also implies:  
     
'
0
Y
k
k
k k
k k Y
kk
k k
k
PV
z YV R
PR R C
Y
∂
∂ ∂+ = >∂∂ −∂
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we then also easily show that the effects of taxes and capacity on reduced form 
demand are: 
    
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A B A B
r r
A B
X X X X
t t
X X
R R
τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂< < > >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂< <∂ ∂
      (A1.16)  
where reduced form demand is denoted by the superscript r. Moreover, we 
have
r r
A A
X X
tτ
∂ ∂>∂ ∂ .   
 Finally, to determine the impact of taxes and capacities on local demands, we 
have (see A1.4-A1.5): 
r r
A A A
A A A
r r
A A
A A
r r
A A
B B
r r
A A
B B
r r
A A A
A A A
r r
A A
B B
Y z zX
t X t t
Y z X
X
Y z X
t X t
Y z X
X
Y z zX
R X R R
Y z X
R X R
τ τ
τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂
  
Substituting previous results, it follows after simple algebra: 
                                
0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0
r r r r
A A A A
A B A B
r r
A A
A B
Y Y Y Y
t t
Y Y
R R
τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂> > < <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂
   (A1.17) 
 
Optimal taxes 
 We focus on region A. Consider the problem of determining the welfare 
optimal taxes on local and transit transport, conditional on the existing capacities in 
both regions and taking tax levels in B as given. Region A solves: 
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,
0
1( ( ))
A
A A
Y
Y Y
A A A A A A A At
A
Max W P y dy g Y t Y X K
Rτ
τ= − + + −∫ .           
    
where AK is the unit rental cost of capacity, and the demand functions are the reduced 
form demands just described. The first-order condition with respect to the local tax 
rate can be written as:         
 0
r r Y r r
Y YA A A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A
Y Y g Y XP g Y t Y
t t t t t
τ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
Differentiating           
    ( ) ( )Y YA A A A A A AP Y g C V R t= = +   
and using equality of generalized price and generalized cost in equilibrium allows us 
to rewrite this expression, after simple manipulation, as follows: 
                                ( ) ( )' ' 0r rAA A A A A A A A
A A
Y Xt C Y R C Y R
t t
τ∂ ∂− + − =∂ ∂                   
A similar procedure is used to show that the first-order condition with respect to 
Aτ can be written as:                               
 ( ) ( )' ' 0r rAA A A A A A A A
A A
Y Xt C Y R C Y R Xττ τ
∂ ∂− + − + =∂ ∂          
                To determine the optimal taxes, we write the system in matrix notation and 
solve by Cramers’ rule. We find, using similar manipulations as described in De 
Borger et al. (2005), the following tax rule for local traffic and transit, respectively: 
                 ' '( )A A A A A A At Y X C R LMEC XC R= + = +                                             
                                         
r
A
A
A A r
A
A A
Y
tLMEC X
z X
t
τ
τ
 ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂  ∂ ∂ 
                                                 
where 'A A A ALMEC Y C R= is the local marginal external cost. 
 To show that the transit tax exceeds the local tax subtract the two taxes, use 
previous results and explicitly substitute the definition of ∆ . We find:  
                       ' 1 0
X
B
A A B B
B
zPt X C R
X X
τ   ∂∂ − = − − + >  ∂ ∂   
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Tax reaction functions: The case of linear demands and costs                                                   
 We report results for country A; all results for B are derived analogously. 
Using linear specifications , the demand for local transport in A conditional on transit 
demand and the local tax is given by: 
    0 1 2
A A A
A AY z z X z t= + +      
where 
0 1 2
* 1, ,
* * *
A A AA A A
A A A A A A
cz z z
d d d
α β
β β β
−= = − = −+ + +  
                                           
Substituting these functions in the equilibrium condition for transit yields:                                
           
    0 1 1 1 1 1( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
r A B
A B A BX z t z tγ γ τ τ γ γ= + + + +  
where:  
    
* *
0 0
0
1
1 0
A B
A A B Ba z zα β α βγ
γ
− − − −= ∆
= − <∆
 
and * *1 1(1 ) (1 ) 0
A B
A Bb z zβ β∆ = + + + + > .  
 The first order conditions for optimal local and transit taxes for country A can 
be written as:  
    ' *( ) ( )A A A A A At Y X C R Y Xβ= + = +                                                      
    
2
* 2 1 1
2 1
( )
r
A
A A
A
A A A Ar A
A
A A
Y
t z zLMEC X Y X
z X z
t
γτ β γ
τ
 ∂   ∂ + = − = −  ∂ ∂    ∂ ∂ 
 
Substituting for transit demand X, using the definitions of the various parameters and 
making use of the specification of ∆  we find, after simple algebra, the reaction 
functions: 
   1
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
B
A A B Bc z t
ττ τ= − −  
   1
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
t A B A
A A B Bt c L z L tτ= + +  
 40 
 
where   * 0 0
1
2
A
A Ac z
τ β γ = +∆  ,       
   * *0 0 0 1
1
1 ( )
2
A
t A A A
A A A A
Lc z T z
T
β γ β γ γ
 = + +   , 
 and    1
1 11 (1 )
A
A
A A
TL
z T
γ
γ= − + ; 
*
1(1 )
A A
AT zβ= +  
Note that simple algebra shows that 1 0AL− < < . 
 Existence of equilibrium in prices follows as in De Borger et al (2005).  
 
 
Appendix 2: The uniform tolling case 
 
Reduced-form demands 
Going through exactly the same derivations as before we easily derive:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( , , ) ( , , )X A A A A A A B B B B B BP X C X z X R R C X z X R Rθ θ θ θ   = + + + + +     
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain the partial effects of the uniform taxes 
on transit demand (the definition of 0∆ >  is the same as before): 
'1 1 0
r
A
A A
A A
zX C Rθ θ
 ∂∂ = − + < ∂ ∆ ∂           
    
                                       '1 1 0
r
B
B B
B B
zX C Rθ θ
 ∂∂ = − + < ∂ ∆ ∂ 
     
      '1 0
r
A
A A A
A A
zX C V R
R R
  ∂∂ = − + <  ∂ ∆ ∂  
 
   '1 0
r
B
B B B
B B
zX C V R
R R
  ∂∂ = − + <  ∂ ∆ ∂  
                     
 
0, 0
0, 0
r r
A A
A B
r r
A A
A B
Y Y
Y Y
R R
θ θ
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂
  
 
Optimal tax rule 
The first-order condition to the problem 
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0
( ( )) ( )
A
A
Y
Y Y A
A A A A A A
A
KMax W P y dy g Y Y X
Rθ
θ= − + + −∫ , 
can be written as: 
          
 ( ) ( ) 0
r r Y r r
Y Y r rA A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A A
Y Y g Y YP g Y Y Xθθ θ θ θ θ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
To simplify, use: 
   [ ]( ) ( )Y YA A A A A A AP Y g C X Y R θ= = + + , 
differentiate with respect to Aθ and substitute to obtain: 
     
 ' 1 ( ) ( ) 0
r r r r
r rA A A
A A A A A
A A A A
Y X Y YY C R Y Xθθ θ θ θ
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− + + + + + + =  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 
Solving for the tax yields: 
A A r r
A
A A
XLMEC
Y X
θ
θ θ
= − ∂ ∂+∂ ∂
 
Noting the signs derived before, it follows that the tax rate exceeds the local marginal 
external cost. 
 
Tax reaction function: linear demand and cost 
 In the case of uniform tolls, the reduced form demand for transit can be written 
as: 
   0
r
A A B BX γ γ θ γ θ= + +  
where  
   
* *
0 0
0
1
1
1 0
1 0
A B
A A B B
A
A
B
B
a z z
z
z
α β α βγ
γ
γ
− − − −= ∆
+= − <∆
+= − <∆
 
Uniform tax increases reduce transit demand.    
 The optimal tax rule for A is given by:  
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*
A A A A Ar r
A
A A
XLMEC Y X
Y X
θ β η
θ θ
= − = −∂ ∂+∂ ∂
 
where 
1 2
1 0
(1 )A A AA z z
η γ= <+ + .  
Reaction functions can be written as: 
   
A
A A B
B
B B A
c m
c m
θ
θ
θ θ
θ θ
= +
= +  
where 
* *
0 1 0
* *
2 1
( )
1 ( )
A A
A A A
A A A
A A A A
z zc
z z
θ β β η γ
β β η γ
+ −= − − − , 
*
1
* *
2 1
( )
1 ( )
A
A A A B
A A
A A A A
zm
z z
β η γ
β β η γ
−= − − − ; coefficients for 
B are defined analogously. The sign of the slopes of the reaction functions can be 
shown to be negative. Indeed, using the definitions of Aη  and Aγ , and substituting for 
∆  in the resulting expressions, the numerator of Am can be shown to be negative, the 
denominator positive. This shows that the reaction function is downward sloping.  
 
Appendix 3: The case of local tolls only 
 
Optimal tax rule 
The first-order condition to the problem 
                                    
0
( ( ))
A
A
Y
Y Y A
A A A A A At
A
KMax W P y dy g Y t Y
R
= − + −∫  
yields, using the same simple manipulations as in previous cases: 
 ( )' 0r r rA AA A A A
A A A
Y Y Xt Y C R
t t t
 ∂ ∂ ∂− + = ∂ ∂ ∂ 
  
Solving for the optimal local toll leads to: 
 1
r
A
A A r
A
A
X
tt LMEC
Y
t
 ∂ ∂ = + ∂  ∂ 
 
Importantly, the term between square brackets can be shown to be between zero and 
one. That it is smaller than one is obvious, since 0, 0
r r
A
A A
Y X
t t
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂ . To see that the 
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bracketed term is positive it suffices to show that 0
r r
A
A A
Y X
t t
∂ ∂+ <∂ ∂ . To do so, elaborate 
as follows:  
 (1 )
r r r r r
A A A A A
A A A A A A A
Y X z z X X z z X
t t t X t t t X t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ = + + = + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
Then substitute for 
r
A
X
t
∂
∂ and use ∆  to find: 
 '1 (1 ) 0
r r
A A A
A A
A A A
Y X z zC R
t t t X
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + = ∆ + + < ∂ ∂ ∆ ∂ ∂   
The implication is economically important. It implies that the optimal tax is positive 
but smaller than the local marginal external cost. 
 
Tax reaction functions: linear demands and costs 
Finally, in the case of local taxes only, we have that the demand for transit only 
depends on the two local taxes; the coefficients are the same as those defined for the 
tax differentiation case. The optimal tax rule can be written as:  
 ' 1
r
A
A A A A r
A
A
X
tt Y C R
Y
t
 ∂ ∂ = + ∂  ∂ 
* 1 1
2
2 1 1
, (1 )
( )
A
A A A A A A
zY s s
z z
γβ γ= = + +        
Note that 0 1As< < . Substituting the reduced form demand for local transport and 
working out leads to the following reaction function for country A’s optimal local tax 
as a function of the local tax in B: 
 tA A A Bt c r t= +  
where 
*
0 1 0
* 2
1 1 2
( )
1 (( ) )
A A
t A A
A A A
A A
s z zc
s z z
β γ
β γ
+= − +  , 
*
1 1 1
* 2
1 1 21 (( ) )
A B
A A
A A A
A A
s z zr
s z z
β γ
β γ= − + .  
Since the numerator of the slope coefficient is negative and the denominator positive, 
it follows that the slope of the reaction function is negative.  
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Appendix 4. Capacity competition in the absence of tolling 
 
 
 For the simplified case of zero taxes, the optimal capacity choice problem 
reduces to:                                    
   
0
1( ( ))
A
A
Y
Y Y
A A A A AR
A
Max W P y dy g Y K
R
= − −∫  
The first-order condition is given by: 
   2
Y
A A
A
A A
g KY
R R
∂ =∂  
Alternatively, it reads: 
   [ ] 2( ) , ( , ) ( , )A A A r rAA A A A A B
A A
C V R KY V Y X R X R R
R R
∂ = = +∂     (A4.1) 
 We are interested in the reaction function in capacities, i.e., the optimal 
capacity in A, conditional on capacity in B. Expression (A4.1) implicitly defines this 
reaction function, which we denote ( )RA BR R . Writing it in implicit form yields:  
    [ ] 2( )( , ) 0A A A AA B A
A A
C V R KR R Y
R R
ψ ∂= − =∂         (A4.2) 
In the remainder of this appendix we focus on the linear demand and cost case. Then 
we have: 
 [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )rrA A A A A A A AA A A A
A A A A
C V R R X Y YXX Y R
R R R R
α β β β∂ ∂ + + ∂∂= = + + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
The final term between brackets is given by:      
   1 1 1(1 )
rr r r r
A A AA A A
A A A A A A A
Y z VX X X Xz z z
R R R R R R R
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ = + + = + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
so that simple algebra yields: 
   [ ] 1( ) (1 ) rA A A AA A A
A A
C V R Xz V R
R R
β∂  ∂= + + ∂ ∂           (A4.3) 
Note that this expression, by the first order condition (A4.2), must be positive: a 
capacity reduction in A raises travel cost. Substituting (A4.3) in (A4.2) leads to: 
   1 2( , ) (1 ) 0
r
A A
A B A A A A
A A
KXR R Y z V R
R R
ψ β  ∂ = + + − =  ∂   
      (A4.4)  
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 To determine the slope of the reaction function we use the implicit function 
theorem: 
   ( )
R
A B B
B
A
R R R
R
R
ψ
ψ
∂
∂ ∂= − ∂∂
∂
            (A4.5) 
where the denominator is negative by the second order condition of the optimal 
capacity choice problem. The sign of (A4.5) therefore depends on the numerator only. 
To determine its sign, differentiate (A4.4) with respect to inverse capacity in B: 
2
1 1(1 ) (1 )( )
rr r
r A AA A
A A A A A A
B B A B A B
V YX XY z R z V R
R R R R R R
ψ β β  ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ = + + + + +  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
        (A4.6) 
This can be simplified as follows. First, noting that in the linear case A1.14) reduces 
to: 
    1(1 )
r
AA A
A
VX z
R
β∂ = − +∂ ∆            (A4.7) 
we have  
   
2
1 2(1 )
A
A
A B B
A
A B
V V
R RX z
R R
β
 ∂ ∂∆ ∆ −  ∂ ∂∂   = − + ∂ ∂ ∆      
.  
Substituting this result in (A4.6) and slightly rewriting yields:  
 
1
1
1
1 2
1
(1 )(1 ) 1
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
A
r A A A
A A A
B B
A
r A A
A A A A
B
rr
A A
A A A
A B
z VY z R
R R
zY z V R
R
YXz V R
R R
βψ β
ββ
β
 + ∂∂ = + − ∂ ∆ ∂ 
 + ∂∆+ +  ∆ ∂ 
  ∂∂+ + + ∂ ∂ 
                  (A4.8) 
Second, using the definition of ∆ , we have 
    1 1
(1 ) 11 (1 ) 0
A
AA
A A A
z R R zβ β+  − = ∆ − + > ∆ ∆  
Third, we further easily show, see (7): 
   1(1 ) 0
r
AA
A A A A
A
VXV R R z
R
β∂  + = ∆ − + > ∂ ∆          (A4.9) 
Fourth, again using the definition of ∆ , we have by differentiation: 
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   11(1 )
B
B
B B B
B B
zz R
R R
β β ∂∂∆ = + + ∂ ∂          (A4.10) 
where  1 0
B
B
B B B B
z d
R d Rβ
∂ = − <∂ + . Working out (A4.10) then shows that:   
    
2( ) 0B B
B B B B
d
R d R
β
β
 ∂∆ = > ∂ + 
                 (A4.11) 
Finally, note that 
    1
r r
AA
B B
Y Xz
R R
∂ ∂=∂ ∂ >0          (A4.12) 
    1(1 )
rr r
AA A
B B B B
V YX X z
R R R R
∂ ∂∂ ∂= + = +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ <0                               (A4.13) 
  
 Substituting (A4.9), (A4.11), (A4.12) and (A4.13) in (A4.8), and using the 
definition of total demand, A AV Y X= + , then gives after simple manipulation: 
1 1 1 1
2
1
1 2
1(1 ) (1 ) (1 2 )
(1 ) ( )(1 )
r
A A r A A
A A A A
B B
A
r A A B B
A A A A
B B B
Xz R z Y z Xz
R R
z dY z V R
d R
ψ β β
β ββ β
∂ ∂   = + ∆ − + + +   ∂ ∆ ∂
 ++ +  ∆ + 
                     (A4.14) 
This expression consists of two terms. The second is positive, the first is ambiguous. 
Since the term  
    0
r
B
X
R
∂ <∂  
the first term will also be positive provided  
    1 1(1 2 )
r A A
AY z Xz+ + <0.          (A4.15) 
This will be the case if transit is relatively important and the impact of transit on local 
demand ( 1 0
Az < ) is sufficiently large in absolute value.   
 Note that it is quite plausible that (A4.15) is satisfied; a sufficient condition is 
that ( 1 0.5
Az > , or alternatively, that A A Ad Rβ< . The left hand side is the slope of the 
local inverse demand function, the right hand side is the slope of the congestion 
function at given capacity. A sufficient (but by no means necessary) condition is, 
therefore, a sufficiently sloped congestion function.  
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 The implication is that capacities in the two regions will be strategic 
complements (i.e., capacity reaction functions are upward sloping) if transit is 
sufficiently important, that is, if transit demand is non-negligible and if more transit 
appreciably reduces local demand through congestion effects. The intuition is clear. 
Suppose region B raises capacity. This attracts more transit through both A and B so 
that, in order to dampen the negative welfare effect on local demand, country A reacts 
by also raising capacity.  
 Note, however, that when transit is rather unimportant and if it does not much 
affect local demand then the reaction functions may in principle be negatively sloped. 
In that case, higher capacity in B induces A to reduce capacity: more transit is 
attracted through both regions by the capacity increase in B, but this hardly affects 
local demand in A so that, given the cost of capacity expansion, it is not worthwhile to 
expand capacity. In fact, capacity is reduced if the welfare loss due to slightly more 
congestion is more than compensated by the marginal capacity cost savings. 
 
Appendix 5: The optimal capacity choice rule for the cases of uniform taxes and 
local taxes only  
  
In the case of uniform taxes the first-order condition can be rewritten as: 
 2( ) ( )
Y r r NE
A A A A A
A A A
A A A A A
dg dY dX KY Y X
dR dR dR R R
θθ ∂− + − + =∂  
with: 
   ( )
Y r r NE
A A A
A A A
A A A A
dg dY dXV R
dR dR dR R
θβ   ∂= + + +  ∂   
   
,
NEr r r
kA A A
k A BA A k A
dY Y Y
dR R R
θ
θ=
∂∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂∑  
                                    
,
NEr r r
k
k A BA A k A
dX X X
dR R R
θ
θ=
∂∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂∑  
Interpretation is as before. The first order condition equates marginal costs and 
benefits of capacity expansion, where the indirect effects via tax adjustment are taken 
into account. Substituting the total derivatives and using the first-order condition for 
optimal tax setting by region A, the optimal capacity choice rule can be reformulated 
as :  
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 2( )
r r r r NE
A A A A B A
A A A A A
A A B B A A
Y X Y X KV Y LMEC
R R R R
θβ θ θ θ
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + =  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 
 Finally, for the case of local tolls only we have: 
 2
Y r NE
A A A A
A A A
A A A A
dg dY t KY t Y
dR dR R R
∂− − =∂  
where  
    ( )
Y r r NE
A A A
A A A
A A A A
dg dY dX tV R
dR dR dR R
β   ∂= + + +  ∂   
    
,
NEr r r
kA A A
k A BA A k A
tdY Y Y
dR R t R=
∂∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂∑  
    
,
NEr r r
k
k A BA A k A
tdX X X
dR R t R=
∂∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂∑  
This can be rewritten as, using the optimal tax condition for region A, as: 
2( )
r r NE r r NE
A A B B A
A A A A A A
A B A A B A A
Y Y t X X t KV Y t LMEC LMEC
R t R R t R R
β    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − + + + =   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂          
 
Appendix 6: Calibration of parameters for numerical example  
 
Remember that the parameters , , ,a b c d describe the demand for local and transit 
transport, and ,α β determine the congestion function. Moreover, 
* 0.0005*Rβ β β= = , and K is the cost of capacity. All parameters are the same in A 
and B, reflecting symmetry.  
 
 
a 567.11 
b 0.34 
c 283.56 
d 0.17 
α 34.34 
β∗ 0.01 
β 23.92 
Κ 18.69 
Table A6.1. Calibration constants (identical for regions A and B) 
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